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Abstract
We look at two traditions for talking about creative activity,
one originating in the classical Latin use of the word “creare”
as a natural process of bringing about change, the other in
Jerome’s later use in the Vulgate bible, referring to the Chris-
tian God’s creation of the world from nothing but ideas. We
aim to show that because the latter tradition has predominated
recently in the fields of Psychology and Artificial Intelligence
these academic fields have been limited in scope to the West-
ern culture of individualism and progress. We argue that the
former tradition is a more general and useful notion as it ap-
plies more readily to describing human experience and activ-
ity as well as applying equally to other non-western cultures.
Furthermore, because both traditions are still alive, and since
they are both referred to through the use of this word “creativ-
ity”, there is chronic confusion in everyday modern discourse
as well as in Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. We out-
line these two traditions in order to understand and unpick
this confusion and discuss implications for future research.
Introduction
The modern science of creativity started in 1950 when JP
Guilford published his paper “Creativity” which he had read
that year as the presidential address to the American Psycho-
logical Association. This word soon replaced the established
concept of “creative imagination” (Engell, 1981) which was
studied by a wide range of Psychologists interested in cre-
ative activity. Guilford was an expert in Psychometrics, the
measurement of mind, and he offered “creativity” as a mea-
surable psychological power or propensity, distinct from the
familiar “intelligence”. It was presented as a power that
would explain the products of “creative genius”, of Einstein
and Picasso, as well as more mundane inventions in indus-
try and war, and the imaginative productions of children and
adults. Guilford defined the word by explaining that “The
creative person has novel ideas” (Guilford 1950:452), and
“creativity refers to the abilities that are most characteristic
of creative people”.
It was soon recognised that it was not enough just to have
new ideas; they have to result in something of value: “The
creative work is a novel work that is accepted as tenable or
useful or satisfying by [sic] a group in some point in time”
(Stein, 1953: 311). This definition of creativity, involving
novelty and value has dominated both Psychology and Arti-
ficial Intelligence (AI), as in Margaret Boden’s “the ability to
generate novel, and valuable, ideas” (Boden, 2009:24). The
scope of this modern concept (from child art to Michelan-
gelo) carried with it the old mystery of how the human mind,
the product of evolution, could be behind the astonishing
achievements of “creative genius” . The task of Psychology
and AI therefore, has been to understand scientifically the
mechanisms underlying these achievements.
Until around the 1920s the word “creativity” was rarely
used, but when it did appear it did not refer to a psycho-
logical propensity, but to new productions and changes in
a culture or an individual, as in “the cycle of creativity, in
which the languages from which our present tongues are de-
rived, were formed” (Stuart-Glennie, 1874). or “the period
of Shakespeare’s [sic] dramatic creativity which produced
Cymbeline and The Tempest” (Ward, 1899: 240).
The word “creative” on the other hand was common dur-
ing the early 20th century. “Creative imagination” had been
around since the 18th century, and this was the name given
to the process of thinking underlying creative activity, stud-
ied especially by Developmental Psychologists interested in
the ability of children to think and act imaginatively (Ri-
bot 2006). But “creative” was used in a different sense by
John Dewey in the title of the book he edited in 1917 called
“Creative Intelligence”. Dewey, and the other authors of this
book, used the word “creative” to express their belief that
intelligence is inherently a process of inquiry and reflection
that comes through a strong sense of “being in the world”, in
direct opposition to the more mechanical conception of in-
telligence contained in IQ tests. As a practical expression of
this belief “Creative writing” was pioneered in schools that
were based on Dewey’s principles (Mearns, 1925), and sev-
eral significant works on creative activity appeared, where
the emphasis is on the ongoing experience of a human be-
ing in the world. These included Dewey’s seminal Art and
Experience (1934) and Wertheimer’s Productive Thinking
(1945), two of the most important psychological works on
this topic that have ever been written. Wertheimer’s chapter
on Einstein succeeded in showing both Einstein’s brilliance
and the grounding of his thought in experience; without any
of the mystery about it stirred up by treating creativity as a
power in the mind
The reason that “creativity” started to become more pop-
ular seems to have been Alfred North Whitehead’s use of
the word for the process of generating novelty in the theory
of physical evolution that was the mainstay of his process
metaphysics (Whitehead, 1976, first published 1929). After
the publication of Whitehead’s philosophy, the word “cre-
ativity” became more common in academia, and towards
the end of the 1940’s it turned up as a buzz word in the
fields of marketing and self-help. It figured prominently
in Alex Osborn’s best seller, Your Creative Power, where
it replaced his earlier use of “creative imagination” which
was the standard term used by Psychologists investigating
creative activity. Osborn was an advertising executive and
the inventor of Brainstorming as a way of releasing creative
power from social inhibitions. Guilford may well have been
encouraged by this to develop his own version of “creativ-
ity” as a mental power, with its definition, essentially that
of Alex Osborn, of creativity as the generation of valuable
novelty. This definition certainly works well for Osborn’s
usage in marketing and it understandably thrives in a capi-
talist economy that depends upon the never-ending supply of
new commodities. It works less well when the product is not
a marketable commodity, but an activity like dance, or jazz
improvisation, or the traditional painting of icons and illu-
minated manuscripts. For instance the Lindisfarne Gospels
from the early 8th century were recently put on display in the
Bishop Cosin library under the shadow of Durham Cathedral
in the Northeast of England. The manuscripts were extraor-
dinary and beautiful, high in quality and appropriate to their
original purpose. It is, as the Exhibition Guide points out
. . . one of the greatest landmarks of human cultural
achievement. Created by the community of St Cuthbert
on Lindisfarne ? an outstanding example of creativity
and craftsmanship from medieval times. 1
Most people would agree that the author of the guide was
right to consider them an example of creativity, and stretch-
ing a point we may say they were novel, nothing exactly
like it had been done before. But this stretches too far since
it is not “novelty” that the authors of the guide are refer-
ring to when they speak about creativity but something much
deeper. The manuscripts are not so much novel as the high
point of a tradition, like the Alhambra in Granada, a John
Coltrane Solo, a Ming vase, or Bach’s B minor Mass.
But in spite of these difficulties, the definition of creativity
as novelty has stuck and, we believe, obscured the pioneer-
ing work of Dewey and colleagues starting with his concept
of creative intelligence. This, we argue, deserves to play
a much stronger role in thinking about our approach to de-
signing novel computational systems. In this paper we try to
show historically how and why creativity has become such
an overloaded term, as a way of disambiguating two versions
which provides us with a fuller understanding about how we
approach the design of novel computational systems in gen-
eral.
The profligacy of “creativity”
After 1950, the word became Protean in its scope. Aston-
ishingly for a term of scientific enquiry, and following on
directly from Guilford, the word took on a wide variety of
1Exhibition Guide, Lindisfarne Gospels in Durham, 2013 p.3
meanings. It was at once a psychological power, and a pro-
cess in the mind, as well as also being the product of that
process (Eysenck, 1995). In addition, it has retained some of
the pre-Guilford older meanings of an activity taking place
in the world. With creativity it seemed there was room for
everyone.
In a much quoted paper Rhodes (Rhodes, 1961) translated
the 4 P’s of successful marketing - “Price, Product, Promo-
tion, and Place” - into the 4 P’s of creativity, “Person, Pro-
cess, Product and Press”, where Press refers to the environ-
mental determinants. Creativity is the result of the 4 P’s.
There is nothing special about this, since the same scheme
of 4 P’s could be used for “achievement” or “innovation” or
“depression”. What is odd and different in the case of “cre-
ativity” is that the word is not only the result of the 4 P’s,
but can refer to each of the first three of the four P’s, as well
as to the system that incorporates all 4 of them. Whilst it
would be absurd to identify any of the 4 P’s of marketing
with successful marketing itself, this is what occurs in the
case of “creativity”. Creativity needs Creativity to explain
itself. It is no surprise therefore to find that one leading The-
ologian has identified it with God. Gordon Kaufman, the
late Mallinckrodt Professor of Divinity at Harvard Divinity
School substituted “creativity” for “the word” in the opening
verses of the Gospel of John: “in the beginning was creativ-
ity, and the creativity was with God, and the creativity was
God.” (Kaufman, 2004: ix).
Major contradictions are not hard to find. It is uniquely
human (“the distinctively human capacity to generate new
ideas, new approaches, and new solutions” (Hennessey and
Amabile, 2010: 570)), but it also occurs in animals (Bateson
and Martin, 2013); and it is an unmitigated good (“positive
value is a crucial part of the definition of creativity”; (Boden,
1994: 558)) but takes on a malevolent form in the hands
of bad people like terrorists (Cropley et al, 2010). No one
takes much notice of such anomalies since the word is so
malleable that it can readily be shaped to fit every situation.
Given all this, it is not surprising that early on in the mod-
ern career of “creativity” Liam Hudson could write:
This odd word [‘Creativity’] . . . applies to all those
qualities of which psychologists approve. And like so
many other virtues . . . it is as difficult to disapprove
of as to say what it means. As a topic for research,
“creativity” is a bandwagon; one which all of us suffi-
ciently hale and healthy have leapt athletically abroad.
(Hudson 1966: 100-101).
and little has changed since hudson wrote this
The word [“creativity”] has, historically, undergone
several shifts in meaning, and it continues to mean dif-
ferent things to different people. (Cardosa et al 2009:
21).
and such a word, vague but redolent with promise and
progress, is a gift to politicians, for Kennedy in 1962
. . . we are coming to understand that the arts incarnate
the creativity of a free society. We know that a totali-
tarian society can promote the arts in its own way–that
it can arrange for splendid productions of opera and
ballet, as it can arrange for the restoration of ancient
and historic buildings. But art means more than the
resuscitation of the past: it means the free and uncon-
fined search for new ways of expressing the experience
of the present and the vision of the future. When the
creative impulse cannot flourish freely, when it cannot
freely select its methods and objects, when it is deprived
of spontaneity, then society severs the root of art. 2
(Kennedy, 1962)
and President Obama in his 2011 State of the Union address
What we can do - what America does better than any-
one else - is spark the creativity and imagination of our
people (quoted in Bateson and Mason, 2013: 85)
Scientists themselves have been eager to lend support to this
patriotic mission. As Guilford declared soon after the launch
of Sputnik by the USSR, when the anxiety about “Falling
Behind” 3 was at its height:
The preservation of our way of life and our future se-
curity depend upon our most important national re-
sources: our intellectual abilities and, more particu-
larly, our creative abilities. It is time, then, that we
learn all we can about those resources (Guilford, 1959:
469).
And 50 years later, when the clash of civilizations had re-
placed that of political ideologies, Hennessey and Amabile
wrote, in the 2010 Annual Review of Psychology:
If we are to make real strides in boosting the creativ-
ity of scientists, mathematicians, artists, and all upon
whom civilization depends, we must arrive at a far
more detailed understanding of the creative process, its
antecedents, and its inhibitors. The study of creativity
must be seen as a basic necessity. (Hennessey and Am-
abile, 2010:570)
In the past, the beginning of a new science has always
been marked by a new precision in the use of key concepts, a
process analysed in detail by the French historian of science
Gaston Bachelard (Tiles, 1984). But precisely the opposite
has happened in the case of creativity. We have seen a rea-
sonably precise and developing discourse on creativity and
creative activity before 1950 turn into semantic chaos. The
earlier science of Dewey and Wertheimer was ignored, or
even denied after Guilford had led the way by declaring him-
self “appalled” at the historical neglect of creativity. But we
are not here to blame Guilford. What happened goes deeper.
He unwittingly amalgamated two very powerful traditions
in thinking about creative activity, and much of our present
2John F. Kennedy: Magazine Article “The Arts in America.”,”
December 18, 1962. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Wool-
ley, The American Presidency Project
3Teitelbaum (2014). It continues: “It is the education, skill,
creativity, and entrepreneurship of a country’s population that will
determine whether it will prosper or fall behind in the twenty-first
century” (Teitelbaum, 2014:1). See also Cohen-Cole (2009, 2014)
for a detailed and critical historical account of how the ideal of an
open-minded, creative individual became a defining feature of cold
war politics, and shaped the progress of cognitive science.
confusion about creativity follows from their unmarked min-
gling in both everyday talk and academic discourse.
Here we illustrate this by outlining the history of these
two traditions, and end by using the distinction between
them to point towards a possible way forward for Compu-
tational Creativity.
The history of two traditions
In the classical Latin of Cicero and Lucretius, “creare” had
meant bringing about or having an impact through natural
forces. In Lucretius’ first century poem On the Nature of
Things (Lucretius, 1992), where he described a version of
evolution which was materialistic but not strictly mecha-
nistic, because his atoms were liable to chance “swerves”.
Creare was part of the natural (including human) world of
creation and dissolution, as in the birth of a child (the father
being the creator, mother creatrix), or the growth of plants.
A little earlier Cicero had used creare to refer to the found-
ing of Rome by Romulus and the appointment of a consul.
Creare was different from “facere”, to make out of available
materials, as in the world-making of the old creator Gods
described in Plato’s Timaeus (Plato, 1977), and facere was
used in early Latin versions of the Bible.
But in St Jerome’s 4th century version, known as the Vul-
gate Bible, the word creare was used instead of facere, and
this was taken to mean creation out of nothing but ideas in
God’s mind. Once done the creation was distinct from Him-
self but what He actually did to bring it about was a matter of
debate. William Harvey, who discovered the circulation of
the blood, suggested that the Creation came into being with
a nod from God, giving the matter some scientific credibil-
ity, since Harvey falsely believed that the words ’nod’ and
’neurone’ were etymologically connected (Kassler,1991).
This new Christian meaning of creare was a mixture of
the old creare and facere, so that the word “create” means
to bring about by making. But it has never succeeded in
obliterating the older Pagan meanings, in which creare (to
bring about) is distinct from facere (to make). Both mean-
ings of create, Christian and Pagan, often occur together
in English. For instance, both senses occur in Mary Shel-
ley’s 1818 novel on the scientific creation of a human being,
Frankenstein. Dr Frankenstein writes (drawing on the Chris-
tian sense) “I began the creation of a human being” (Shelley,
1985: 52). Later in the book, having murdered Franken-
stein’s child, the monster uses the Pagan meaning:
I too can create desolation; my enemy is not invul-
nerable; this death will carry despair to him, and a
thousand other miseries shall torment and destroy him.
(Shelley 1985: 138).
Both meanings are present 200 years later:
Reggae-Jazz crossover SKAMEL arrived, almost unan-
imously, with spectacular facial hair creations . . . they
were impressive but in no way prepared us for the musi-
cal spectacular with which they laid waste to an excel-
lent, enthusiastic and appreciative audience, thereby
creating a long-memorable evening of superb jazz. 4.
4http://jatpjazz.blogspot.co.uk/p/been-gone-and-wow.html
To distinguish these two meanings we will call Jerome’s
(Christian) meaning of “creare” G-creative (where G stands
for God, but could also be linked to Genius or Guil-
ford). And the older (Pagan) meaning of “creare” N-
Creative, where N stands for nature, as for Lucretius creare
was the unfolding of natural processes. In this scheme
SKAMEL’s hair creations were G-creative and creating a
long-memorable evening N-creative.
The cognates “create”, “creation”, and “creative” have be-
come increasingly popular over the centuries. “Creativity”,
on the other hand remained rare until the 20th century. In the
13th century Duns Scotus used it as though it were a kind
of power possessed by God. William of Ockham ridiculed
Scotus for this (Leff, 1975: 148), as though you were to take
the general word (collective noun) for horses, “equinity”,
and treat it as an independent entity with causal powers over
and above individual horses, and say “equinity enables us to
travel faster than walking”. If God created the world (which
Ockham didn’t doubt) it was because that is what God did,
not because of some mysterious power called “creativity”.
G-Creative
During the Renaissance the biblical sense of God’s Creation,
the inventing of a world out of nothing but ideas, was taken
as analogous to artistic productions, and the analogy was
common in discussions of art and poetry in Italy in the 15th
and 16th centuries (Charlton, 1913; Panofsky, 1968), and in
later discussions of “creative genius” (Abrams 1953: 381),
a notion that became common during the 18th century. This
analogy with God applied to “high art”, great paintings, po-
etry and music, and it led to a contrast with crafts or low art
made out of given materials, and relying only on skill rather
than ideas.
The analogy was in the background when modern Psy-
chology arose from the problem of accounting for mental
processes in the mechanistic world of 17th century Physics.
The most pressing problem was to explain how works of
creative genius (by definition original and non-mechanical)
can emerge from the association of ideas, in the mechanistic
systems put forward by the two great English philosophers
of the 17th century, Hobbes and Locke. Their associationist
theories formed a closed system in that outputs are explained
by lawful processes that occur within a mind that is separate
from the world, from which it passively receives inputs, like
messages. This creates a mystery, sometimes explained by
inspiration, and this pattern of thought has continued to this
day. As Herb Simon wrote over three centuries later:
The notion that creativity requires inspiration derives
from puzzlement about how a mechanism (even a bio-
logical mechanism like the brain), if it proceeds in its
lawful mechanistic way, can ever produce novelty (Si-
mon 1995: 945).
Both Hobbes and Locke had recognised the problem, and
neither were inclined to appeal to supernatural inspiration.
Hobbes suggested what we might refer to as the “Spaniel
Search Metaphor” as a solution. In this account, the inven-
tive mind searches through ideas in imagination and mem-
ory like a spaniel that “ranges the field, till he finds a scent”
(Hobbes, 1962: 22). This search metaphor was used to ac-
count for creation by the poet and playwright John Dryden,
and in outline has remained the preferred cognitive process
account for invention of all kinds. In the 18th century the
answer to the problem of invention in art and science be-
came “creative imagination”, starting with Addison’s Plea-
sures of the Imagination, where he wrote that imagination
“has something in it like creation ... it makes additions to
nature” (Engell, 1981: 36-37) and the analogies of God and
spaniel remained in the background as the issue of creative
genius merged into the beginnings of psychology.
Leibniz used a more complex version of this to explain
theodicy, which was his attempt to reconcile evil with the
goodness of God. His argument started from the premise
that a world in which everything was perfect would be static
and boring, and therefore unsatisfactory. To make it bet-
ter God was obliged (given his good intentions) to bring in
variation and change, which precludes a steady state of per-
fection. So God could not make it perfect, only as good as
possible, and to achieve this Leibniz envisaged a combinato-
rial process in which God arrives at the best of all combina-
tions. In 1740 Leibniz’s model of God’s creation was used
by the Swiss writers Johann Bodmer and Johann Breitinger
to account for poetic creation within the framework set up
by Addison (Abrams 1953:276).
Work on creative imagination continued during the 19th
century, and in France Alfred Binet and Theodor Ribot be-
gan experimental studies, especially in children. This cog-
nitive work based on the association of ideas continued in
Britain during the 20th century after the publication in 1906
of Ribot’s Creative Imagination. Osborn’s “Your Creative
Power” in 1948 referred to this work, but began to use “cre-
ativity” in place of “creative imagination” (although this was
not the meaning given it by Whitehead), and this opened the
way for Guilford’s use in 1950. Osborn had seen it as a
mystery beyond scientific explanation. Guilford agreed that
it was a mystery, but one that will be cleared up by science,
presumably like the mystery of Life, or the Universe. Creat-
ing an extraordinary mystery that only science can solve is a
smart tactic to start a bandwagon.
N-Creative
At the end of the 18th century another theoretical approach
emerged, an alternative to the tacit analogy with God’s cre-
ation and this new theory followed from a return to the older
pagan, materialist meaning of creare, N-creative rather than
G-creative. Instead of treating the mind as a closed system,
isolated from the world of nature, but adding to nature by a
God-like process of creation, it began to treat mind and na-
ture as inseparable parts of an open system, drawing on ear-
lier work by Shaftesbury and Leibniz (in his philosophy of
nature rather than his theodicy). There were two aspects of
this, one very sober, starting with Hume, and the other more
revolutionary. The revolution came from German philoso-
phy and then philosopher-poets, such as Schiller, Novalis
and Goethe; it was brought to Britain and taken further by
Coleridge and Wordsworth and their circle. For these writers
human creating is like the growth of a plant, flourishing in
its special environment, rather than caused by the operations
of an associative mechanism.
In a version of Hobbes’ spaniel metaphor, Hume in 1739
described how “the imagination suggests its ideas, and
presents them at the very instant, in which they become nec-
essary or useful”. It is as though “the whole intellectual
world of ideas was at once subjected to our view” and we
just pick out what is needed. But this is not what happens
since only the needed ideas are present which “are thus col-
lected by a kind of magical faculty in the soul, which, tho’
it always be most perfect in the greatest geniuses . . . is
however inexplicable by the utmost efforts of human under-
standing” (Hume,1978:24). Hume did not believe in magic,
and “a kind of magical faculty” is a way of expressing his
recognition that the steps of a mechanistic account using as-
sociation of ideas will not explain creative thinking, even
when the spaniel metaphor is added.
The way forward was to make human invention a prod-
uct, not of human mind alone, but of human mind act-
ing on the environment, and this insight proved one of the
great achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment follow-
ing Hume. In 1774 in Aberdeen, Alexander Gerard de-
scribed invention as the result of conjecture and experimen-
tation, and 75 years later another Aberdonian, Alexander
Bain, refined this by introducing “trial and error” (Bain,
1855). The answer to the psychological problem had be-
gun to change, and this became a revolution in the hands
of poet-philosophers in Germany and Britain around 1800.
Instead of asking “How can a mechanistic mind generate
new ideas?”, the question became “How does a person en-
gage with her physical and social surroundings in order to
create her own world, which is a pre-requisite to human cre-
ation and invention?”. This goes beyond the concept of mind
as isolated mechanism, and invites a systemic approach in-
volving organism and environment. In accord with this, the
metaphor of mechanism was replaced with one of growth,
and this was to some extent a return to the earlier meaning
of create as creare in Lucretius (Nisbet, 1986; Bell, 1994).
Creare was to bring about or have an impact through facere,
doing or making, and the two process are typically linked in
movement or flow, exemplified by growth.
This was expressed by a number of important writers in
Germany and Britain, and drew explicitly on their own expe-
rience. Amongst writers in English the most important were
Wordsworth and Coleridge in Britain, who were followed by
Emerson and Thoreau in the States. Coleridge provided the
philosophy, struggling for an organic metaphor to replace
Locke’s psychic mechanism, and finding it in his account of
poetry. Writing of his friend Wordsworth’s poetry in their
Lyrical Ballads he describes it as aiming:
to give the charm of novelty to things of every day . . .
by awakening the mind’s attention from the lethargy of
custom, and directing it to the loveliness and the won-
ders of the world before us (Coleridge, 1983: 7)
And in a later work he wrote that in poetry “Nature [is]
idealized through the creative power of a profound yet ob-
servant meditation”, and through science poetry is “substan-
tiated and realised” (quoted in Corrigan, 1982: 131). In the
Idiot Boy, for instance, the “lethargy of custom” led many to
report disgust at Wordsworth’s portrayal of a mother’s love
of her son, but Wordsworth’s “observant meditation” went
much deeper than the lethargy of custom to a human real-
ity, the mother’s love. Both poetry and science reveal reality
through the power of “observant meditation”, exemplified
for science in Coleridge’s’s friend Humphrey Davy. In his
poetry Wordsworth began to use “creative” for a way of liv-
ing in the world. In the 1805-6 edition of his long autobio-
graphical poem, The Prelude, Wordsworth wrote:
The exercise and produce of a toil,
Than analytic industry to me
More pleasing, and whose character I deem
Is more poetic as resembling more
Creative agency.
In these ways “creative” began to refer to a particular way
of acting in the world, mindful and inquiring, rather than
being defined in terms of a product, the “Creation”. It in-
volved an immersion in the life around in order to bring
about the world from which art and science could emerge.
As Wordsworth’s younger contemporary John Keats wrote
in 1817, “That which is creative must create itself” (White,
2012:73) . It can occur in nature herself, as when Thoreau
wrote on the shape of snow crystals: “How full of the cre-
ative genius is the air in which these are generated?” (Searls,
2009: 354). But it usually referred to immersion in an ac-
tivity, as in Emerson’s “creative reading” in 1837 (Emerson,
1975), and Matthew Arnold’s “creative criticism” of 1865
(Arnold, 1914).
This newer meaning of “creative” (N-creative) did not re-
place the older G-creative (which entails a specific product),
and they existed alongside each other, as in “creative ge-
nius” or “creative invention” (e.g. Ward, 1899). But it is the
newer conception of N-creative that led directly to the work
of John Dewey and G.H. Mead in the early 20th century.
Dewey wrote on both Arnold and Emerson, and is known to
have been strongly influenced by Wordsworth (Gale, 2010).
His reflex arc paper of 1896 (Dewey, 1896), in which stim-
ulus and response form a feedback loop inseparable from
ongoing activity (instead of a link in causal chain), provides
an organic unit of the kind Coleridge struggled to find. His
friend and colleague the social psychologist G.H. Mead, had
contributed one of the chapters in Dewey’s Creative Intelli-
gence of 1917 where he had written, echoing Keats, “The in-
dividual in his experiences is continuously creating a world
which becomes real through his discovery”. (Mead 1964).
This word “creativity”
It was soon after Dewey’s publication of Creative Intel-
ligence that Whitehead used the word “creativity” in his
philosophical writings while at Harvard in the 1920’s, in
which he attempted to replace the old clockwork mechanism
of Laplace with a universe (like that of Lucretius) incorpo-
rating chance. He used the word “creativity” in his own spe-
cial way, as change or “passing on” that is inherent in the
world, and which he referred to as “the principle of nov-
elty” (Whitehead, 1976: 21). He wrote that he meant it in
the dictionary sense of the verb creare, “to bring forth, beget,
produce” (Whitehead, 1976: 213), which we have glossed in
our account of N-creative as ’bring about’ in nature, rather
than through the power of a mind, though this is one form
of it. According to Whitehead, “originality” emerges out of
this; it belongs to life, as living organisms act on their envi-
ronments and break away from the “line of their ancestry”
(Whitehead, 1976: 104).
Whitehead’s lectures at Harvard soon appeared in print.
They were closely argued and difficult, but had an immedi-
ate impact, especially in the States. Dewey discussed them
with Mead (Cook, 1979) and the word “Creativity” appeared
in section headings in the latter’s best known book (Mead
1934). Even though these headings were added by the editor
(Meyer, 2005), they reflect Mead’s intentions, and probably
played their part in the burgeoning familiarity of the word,
since the book was widely read amongst Psychologists and
Sociologists. Dewey himself wrote on Whitehead (Dewey,
1937) and later started to use the word “creativity” in a way
that draws on both Whitehead and William James.
In 1948 he wrote of “the life factor that varies from the
previously given order, and that in varying transforms in
some measure that from which it departs, even in the very
act of receiving and using it. This creativity is the mean-
ing of artistic activity - which is manifested not just in what
are regarded as the fine arts, but in all forms of life that are
not tied down to what is established by custom and conven-
tion. In re-creating them in its own way it brings refresh-
ment, growth, and satisfying joy to one who participates.”
(Dewey, 1948). This N-Creative activity is activity that can
have an impact by sustaining or changing the established or-
der that has guided the individual and the society to which
she belongs; and it is present in everyday activities, such as
gardening or cooking, where there is a state of creative in-
telligence and a readiness for inquiry. He had already spelt
this theory out in Art as Experience (1934).
At the same time, 1948, Alex Osborn was using “creativ-
ity” in a very different way to mean the power released by
brainstorming, and two years later Guilford introduced his
own G-creative version of this as the essence of creativity.
What does this mean for future research?
These two strands in history, G-creative and N-creative, de-
fine two distinct theories of creative activity that stem from
two distinct meanings of “creative”. N-creative is a way of
living and acting in the world and it is inherent in all activity
unless constrained by authority, or by self-imposed routine.
It goes with a concept of intelligence based on attentive in-
quiry, rather than a mental power. G-creative is based on the
power to generate valuable novelty, and it is distinct from
intelligence, which in the IQ testing tradition is a relatively
mechanical process of knowledge and problem solving.
These two theories have been living alongside each other
for 75 years. They have shared the same name, and accord-
ingly have been treated as the same. G-creative has fitted
most readily into Psychology and AI, with several dissent-
ing voices (Howe, 2001; Sawyer, 2006). N-creative has been
more at home in Humanistic Psychology (Maslow, 1968;
Rogers, 1954) and Education (Holbrook, 1964; Woods and
Jeffrey, 1996). But there has been much mingling and over-
lap and this is what has caused much of the confusion. Ani-
mals are N-creative but not G-creative, so if we have only the
one term “creativity” they both do and do not show creativ-
ity. Can we prise the two theories apart and decide between
them as the basis for future research, or do we need both?
One important criterion is range. We have seen that G-
creative is aimed at art works and inventions in the Western
world, that exist, like God’s creation, independently of the
creator. But this is limited since “valuable novelty” and the
focus on products belong to a world of profit and economic
growth, to museums and concert halls. It does not readily
include improvised dance, music and story-telling that plays
a predominant part in earlier or non-Western traditions, and
there is a kind of missionary zeal in the spread of G-creative
around the world. It is clearly on the side of progress,
whereas N-creative is more universal, and involves change
within a tradition. Traditions themselves may be worth pre-
serving, especially if they are necessary for creative activity
to take place (Hallam and Ingold, 2007: 48, 113). But un-
like G-creative there has been little attempt to formalise the
assumptions underlying N-creative. How could we do this?
According to G-creative theory, the mind, like that of
God, generates novel ideas which result in valuable prod-
ucts. In the field of AI (and explicitly its subfield compu-
tational creativity) this has been explored by trying to sim-
ulate creativity using criteria similar to those of the Turing
test (Turing, 1950; Boden, 1994). More recently there have
been questions raised about the feasibility of the Turing test
in relation to creativity (Bedworth and Norwood 1999), and
Negrotti (1991) has suggested that AI (and by extension CC)
can treat the intelligence and creativity of machines as of
interest in themselves, rather than as a way of understand-
ing human intelligence or creative activity. The Turing test
would then become superfluous, except as entertainment,
but it would mean dropping the “value” requirement for cre-
ativity, insofar as this is measured against the evaluation of
human products. Recognising this, Dorin and Korb have
proposed “creativity that is independent of notions of value
or appropriateness” (Dorin and Korb, 2012), and Colton and
Wiggins suggest replacing “value” in the definition of cre-
ativity with “impact” (Colton and Wiggins, 2012).
This use of “impact” makes it similar to the creare of
N-creative and the historical distinction between N and G-
creative could be used to define this concept. We can take
this definition further in terms of the “social interactions
between self-motivated autonomous agents” (d’Inverno and
Luck, 2013), and the proposal for “artificial creative sys-
tems composed of intrinsically motivated agents engaging
in language games to interact with a shared social and cul-
tural environment” (Saunders (2012:216). We would then
be close to modelling precisely the structures implied in
John Dewey’s N-creative theory of art and invention. The
N-creative theory is made up of two components. An au-
tonomous agent acts on its social world by constructing,
making, talking, playing music, telling jokes, inquiring, etc.
These are facere, and facere brings about change or has an
impact (creare), to a varying degree, on the world, other
agents, or itself. Put together, this system, as a formal state-
ment of Dewey’s definition of creativity in 1948, would em-
body N-creative.
If we are right in the arguments of this paper, it is his-
tory that will have helped us to see that there are alternative
ways of conceptualising what is nowadays included under
the blanket term “creativity”, a term that has become so em-
bedded in our language that even-handed debate on the mat-
ter may have become impossible.
That is why, to go further, we need to formalise the lan-
guage of both theories, G-creative and N-creative, in order
to prise them apart and to decide which version of creativ-
ity is most useful to us. This attempt may point the way to
the design of new technologies, though it may well turn out
that it will be the success or failure of such new technolo-
gies that will enable us to decide between the theories. But
crucially we will have a concept of “creativity” that starts
with Whitehead’s theory of creativity and change, which as
Bown puts it “forces us to think about creativity as a gen-
eral process that can be applied wherever new things come
into existence (Bown 2012:361). This is remarkably close to
what Whitehead had in mind when he introduced the word
“creativity” in the 1920’s. At a more complex level, it gives
rise to biological and social models of creativity as living
organisms act on their environments and break away from
the “line of their ancestry” (Whitehead, 1976: 104). Based
on this, Dewey was working on the psychological theory of
creative activity we have described shortly before he died
in 1952. This would have been an extension to Psychol-
ogy of the “general process” suggested by both Whitehead
and Bown. But Dewey’s pioneering work was forgotten in
the excitement around Guilford’s (in our view muddled and
backward-looking) definition of creativity as an inner pro-
cess and a measurable propensity in 1950. We end with six
specific points for the future of AI research
1. Develop a profound skepticism of “creativity” as a mental
entity.
2. Question why we would ever want to build artificial G-
creative systems.
3. Increase our shared awareness of the N-creative work of
Dewey and Whitehead that has been overshadowed by
Guilford and his concept of creativity.
4. Build formal, computational models of N-creative sys-
tems and use them to build software that can support and
refute these models.
5. Adopt an N-creative approach to designing systems sup-
porting being in the world; enhancing and supporting hu-
man creative activity in all of its forms. (d’Inverno and
McCormack, 2015).
6. Use human experience as the starting point for future sys-
tem design. (Yee-King and d’Inverno, 2016)
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